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TEN YEARS OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
IN COLORADO-i 940-1950*
BENJAMIN S. GALLAND
Professor of Law, Univcrsity of Colorado School of Lw
"At the foundation of Domestic Relations lies the institution
of marriage," states Professor Peck.' We will use his statement
as our excuse for starting with this topic. By statute,2 in 1945,
the Colorado legislature prohibited and declared to be void all
marriages wherein one or both of the parties was under the age
of sixteen years unless, prior to the contracting thereof, a judge
of a court of record of the state shall have approved said marriage
and authorized the issuance of a license therefor. This act has as
yet not been construed.
It is also provided in the Colorado statutes that marriages,
wherein either party is under the age of eighteen years, are de-
clared voidable,3 and actions for annulment may be maintained
upon this ground, "provided the action is commenced before the
party reaches the age of nineteen years." 4
Another section 5 declares certain consanguinous and certain
miscegenetic marriages to be absolutely void. Is there any differ-
ence between a marriage absolutely void as in the last mentioned
statute, and a marriage declared to be "void" as in the 1945 stat-
ute? 6 The word void in other statutes has not always been given
its dictionary absoluteness, but is frequently construed as mean-
ing voidable.
7
That courts seem sympathetic in marriage situations and en-
deavor to protect an unfortunate female in distress by declaring
a valid marriage to exist in doubtful cases, is indicated in two
late opinions. In Moffat Coal Co. v. The Industrial Commission,8
a woman was, by virtue of a common-law marriage, held to be
the widow of one Pete Todd, killed in an industrial accident. Thus
*,This paper was prepared by Mr. Galland as part of the basic research for the
Ten Year Review of Colorado Law presented at the 52nd annual meeting of the Colo-
rado Bar Association in Colorado Springs, October 12-14, 1950. Since Conflicts of Laws
and the Rules of Civil Procedure were covered in other sections of the review, domestic
relations problems relating thereto are not included in this article.
I PECK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS, 3d ed. (1930), p. 129.
2
COLO. LAWS, C. 177, p. 478 (1945) ; COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 107, §(3)1 (1935).
S "All marriages wherein either party is under the age of eighteen years are hereby
declared to be voidable." COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 56, §33 (1935).
4 COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 55, §34 (1935). In Payne v. Payne, 214 P. 2d 495 (1950),
this section and that in the preceding note were held not applicable to a Texas marriage
between residents of Colorado, one of whom was seventeen years old. By the law of
Texas the marriage was valid, not voidable.
aCOLO. STAT. ANN., c. 107, § 2 (1935).
.TIFFANY, DOMESTIC RELATIONS, 3d ed. 1921). At page 25 of this work is the
the following statement: "As will be seen . . . statutes raising the age of consent,
though they may declare a marriage under the age of consent to be void, are construed
to'be voidable, and leave the effect of the marriage as at common law."
7See City and County of Denver v. Jones, 85 Colo. 212, 224 P. 924 (1929). See
also Colorado Annotations ALI, Restatement of Contracts, sec. 178. The common law
note that the marriage of an insane person is absolutely void, was recognized as law
in Cox v. Armstrong, Colo. Bar Ass'n, Advance Sheet, July 29, 1950, p. 363.
8 108 Colo. 388, 118 P. 2d 769 (1941) ; See parallel case Clayton Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 93 Colo. 145, 25 P. 2d 170 (1933).
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she was able to claim benefits under the Workmen's Compensation
Act. Her testimony showed that they lived together, had two
children, that they contemplated a future ceremonial marriage,
that "he kept putting it off and he never did," and that she did
not believe she was married, "because I wasn't." The decision
emphasized the fact that she was uneducated, and her testimony
was not, in words, used "with discriminating care." There was
good evidence of habit and repute.
In a second case 9 a woman had a living husband, one Mason,
when she began living with Reed. Four years later Mason di-
vorced her. She lived eight years, thereafter, with Reed in habit,
repute, and mutual recognition as husband and wife. The woman
was held to be a widow entitled to claim as widow under the Com-
pensation Act. "If there ever was a case where a relationship
unlawful in its inception could be matured into a common-law
marriage . . . this is that case." Continued cohabitation "after
the removal "I of the obstacle to marriage" under the circum-
stances raised a presumption of marriage."
In a case 12 of first impression, the Colorado statute,13 making
absolutely void all marriages between Negroes or mulattoes of
either sex and white persons, was held valid as against the objec-
tion that such statute was discriminatory against Negroes, and
denied defendants equal protection of the law. The case arose
out of a conviction for vagrancy under a Denver ordinance which
included in one of its definitions of the word vagrant, "any person
who shall lead an ... immoral ... course of life." The defendants
were living together claiming to be man and wife by virtue of a
common law marriage. The Supreme Court upheld the defend-
ants' conviction under the ordinance, holding the parties could
not be married either ceremonially or by common law 14 because of
the statute. The court refused to discuss the effect or any uncer-
tainty which might prevail as to the definition of a mulatto in
view of defendants' admission that one was a Negro and one a
white. Judicial notice was taken by the court that Denver was
not within that part of the state acquired from Mexico, wherein
the statute might not be applicable. 15
'Rocky Mt. Fuel Co. v. Reed, 110 Colo. 88, 130 P. 2d 1049 (1941).
10 i.e. Mason's divorce.
. Cases wherein a relation was meretricious in its inception, there being an im-
pediment to the marriage relation and the parties continued to live together as
husband and wife after the removal of the impediment, have caused courts much diffi-
culty. The Colorado case may be contra to the weight of authority. 55 C.J.S. 882-883.
But there is high authority to support the Colorado decision. See Campbell v. Campbell
(The Breadalane Case), L.R. 1 H.L. Sc. 182 (1867). See discussion, MADDEN DOMESTIC
RELATIONS, (1931) pp. 73-75 ; PECK on DOMESTIc RELATIONS, 3rd ed., p. 145 (1930).
12Jackson v. City and County of Denver, 109 Colo. 196, 124 P. 2d 240 (1942).
"3 Supra, note 5.
14 109 Colo. 196, 199.
1"Justice Bouck dissented. Recent cases in the United States Supreme Court,
Sweatt v. Painter, 70 S. Ct. 848 (1950), and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 70
S. Ct. 851 (1950), are of interest in connection with the problem involved In the Jack-
son case. See also, C. D. STOKES, THE SERBIAN BOG OF MISCEGENATION, 21 ROCKY MT.
L. Rgv. 425 (1949). A recent California case held contra to the Colorado case, Perez




A wife was convicted of murder in the second degree. In a
divorce action against her husband, on motion of said wife, the
trial court ordered the defendant to pay into the registry of the
court $300 as the docket fee in the criminal case and for a tran-
script of record to review such conviction in the Supreme Court.
The order was affirmed by the latter court.'" Costs, attorneys fees,
and incidental expenses incurred by a wife in the defense of a
criminal case, and a review of the judgment therein were held
necessaries for which a husband is liable, the wife being destitute.' 7
In Vetting v. Kefover,18 a widower, who paid the medical bills
and funeral expenses of his deceased wife, was held entitled to
recover the same through a claim filed against her estate. The
wife had made no provision for funeral expenses in her will. The
problem was whether the husband or the wife's estate was primarily
liable for such debts. This was a case of first impression in Colo-
rado.' 9
In Wigehert v. Lockhart,:" Wigchert was arrested in Colorado
in obedience to a warrant issued by the governor of Colorado in
compliance with a requisition of the governor of California. He
was charged with being a fugitive from justice. The crime charged
was failure to support his minor children. Wigchert petitioned
for release under writ of habeas corpus. The finding was against
him in the trial court. The Supreme Court reversed the holding,
and ordered Wigchert released, holding that to be a fugitive from
justice, one must have been physically present within the demand-
ing state at the time of the commission of the crime charged. It
is not enough that he was only constructively within its borders.
"Failure to support a wife or child, while the husband or father
is in another state, is no ground for extradition." The determina-
tion of the governor that petitioner is a fugitive from justice was
held not conclusive.
Compare this case with the case of Marsolais v. DeAngelis.2'
In the latter case, petitioner was convicted of nonsupport of wife
and children in Massachusetts, and had violated the terms of a
probation order in that state. He left immediately thereafter with-
out permission of the probation officer. He was held extraditable
in the absence of a showing that the terms of the probation had
been complied with or that no terms of the probation had been
broken.
11Read v. Read, 119 Colo. 278, 202 P. 2d 953 (1949).
"Case noted, 21 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 439" (1949).
18112 Colo. 53, 145 P. 2d 879 (1944). At common law, a wife's funeral expenses
were the primary obligation of the husband, MADDEN, OP. cit. supra note 11, pp. 198-
200. Undoubtedly medical expenses were necessaries for which husband was primarily
liable at common law. Id. 196.
,9 112 Colo. p. 55.
"114 Colo. 485, 166 P. 2d 988 (1946).
21215 P. 2d 315 (1950).
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ANTENUPTIAL AND POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENTS
Husband and wife may make antenuptial 22 or postnuptial 23
agreements inter se barring either from inheriting under the in-
testacy 24 law of Colorado. Such marriage settlements may be
adequate to bar all claims 25 by the survivor in the real and per-
sonal estate of the other at death. The widow's allowance is not
waived by such property settlement unless in terms that do not
admit of a doubt and that clearly and definitely indicate a purpose
to waive this specific statutory right.26 In a late case,27 an ante-
nuptial agreement, in terms barring further claims of the wife
to the husband's property or estate, still left the husband free to
convey or devise to the wife, property over and above what was
necessary to secure the property settlement, and she was free to
accept such as a gift or devise as against his heirs at law.
A situation in which payments to the wife were held con-
tractual and not alimony was involved in International Trust Co.
v. Liebhardt,28 wherein, a separation agreement between the
spouses provided monthly payments of $450 to the wife until her
death or remarriage. Such agreement was by its terms binding
on his heirs, executors, and administrators. The agreement, as
was specified should be done in case of divorce, was incorporated
into a later divorce decree. At the husband's death his executor
claimed that liability to make further payments ceased or was
subject to modification. It was held that the payments were not,
by such incorporation in the decree, made alimony.2 9 No Colorado
case, it was stated in the opinion, definitely holds, "that a court
has power to grant alimony for a period beyond the life of the
husband." Nor were the payments subject to modification by the
divorce court for changed circumstances as in the case with ali-
mony.30 The decreed liability for such payments was based on
contract. Colorado courts have, by statute,31 jurisdiction to en-
force marriage settlement contracts and separate maintenance
agreements whether the parties have been divorced or not.
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE
One case, in its different phases, appeared in the Colorado
Supreme Court on four occasions. The plaintiff therein sought
annulment on the ground that the defendant wife had, at the time
0 Griffee v. Griffee, 108 Colo. 366, 117 P. 2d 823 (1941).
13McCutcheon v. Jordan, 112 Colo. 499, 150 P. 2d 859 (1944).
24 COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 176, §1 (1935).
Is In such case it h'as been held the widow may not breach the contract and claim
one-half of the husband's estate against his will. Remington v. Remington, 69 Colo.
206, 193 P. 550 (1920).
2 Bradley v. Bradley, 106 Colo. 500, 106 P. 2d 1063 (1940); Griffee v. Griffee,
aupra note 22; McLaughlin v. Craig, 117 Colo. 67, 184 P. 2d 130 (1947). Note, 13
ROCKY MT. L. REV. 260 (1941).
27 Bartle v. Bartle, 216 P. 2d 649 (1950).
IsInternational Trust Co. Ex'r. v. Liebhardt, 111 Colo. 208, 139 P 2d 264, 147
A.L.R. 700 (1943).
1Ibid, 111 Colo. 208, 218.
30 International Trust Co. v. Liebhardt, supra, note 28, pp. 216, 217. See also Harris
v. Harris, 113 Colo. 41, 154 P. 2d 617 (1944).
a COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 56, §29 (1935).
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of their purported marriage, another spouse living. At the first
appearance of the case,32 the Supreme Court held that in an annul-
ment suit where the wife appears and defends the validity of the
marriage, she is, on proper showing, in a position to claim alimony
pendente lite and counsel fees. At the second,33 the court held that
the fact that defendant wife had, after her purported marriage
to plaintiff, brought a successful divorce action against the other
man, being induced to do so by the plaintiff (in this annulment
action), did not estop her in the annulment proceeding from testi-
fying that the so-called marriage to the purported first husband
was in fact no marriage at all. In the fourth appearance of the
case it was held that because plaintiff had lived with the defend-
ant six months after knowing of prior marriage, he was not en-
titled to relief in equity.3 4 Also he had not shown that he did not
have an adequate remedy at law.35 In the very recent case of Cox
v. Armstrong, it 'Was held that where the wife commenced a di-
vorce action and was lated adjudged insane, a conservator, ap-
pointed for her estate and directed to represent her interests in
the divorce action, could properly file an amended petition in the
divorce action praying for annulment.
DIVORCE
It is not intended in this review to discuss anything but mat-
ters of substantive law. However, it is deemed proper to call at-
tention to certain late statutes affecting procedure.
By statute,36 in 1945, it was enacted that procedure in actions
of divorce, annulment, and separate maintenance, unless other-
wise expressly provided, "shall be ... as provided for by the Rules
of Civil Procedure . . . for civil actions." The trial 37 of such ac-
tions shall not be had until after the expiration of thirty days
from filing of the complaint, and any party to a divorce action,
"may demand or waive a trial by jury 38 in the manner and
method" provided by the Rules of Civil Procedure. The act also
repealed sections 4, 5, 9, 10, and 12 of chapter 56, '35 C.S.A.
It is of interest to note that in 1947 an act 39 was passed giving
Colorado courts of competent jurisdiction in this state powers to
32Pierce v. Otte, 111 Colo. 374, 142 P. 2d 283 (1943).
,3 Otte v. Pierce, 111 Colo. 386, 142 P. 2d 280 (1943). The third appearance of the
case involved no question of significance. Otte v. Pierce, 116 Colo. 77, 178 P. 2d 676
(1947).
3Otte v. Pierce, 118 Colo. 123, 194 P. 2d 331 (1948). The more approved rule
seems contra. "Where it appears to the court that a marriage is an absolute nullity
the duty. . . is to decree such a marriage void and prevent any further criminal union
of the parties." Simmons v. Simmons, 19 Fed. 2d 690, 54 A.L.R. 75 (1927). See also,
41 HARV. LAW REv. 1059 (1928).
"One wonders whether plaintiff would get his remedy at law. See Garver v.
Garver, 52 1Colo. 227, 127 P. 165 (1912).
3COLO. LAWS, §1, p. 316 (1945) ; COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 56, §5 (1) (Supp. 1949).
37OoLo. LAWS, §2, p. 316 (1945) COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 56, §10 (1) (Supp. 1949).
ICOLO. LAWS, §4, p. 316 (1945); COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 56, §9 (1) (Supp. 1949).
Prior to this statute, it had been held under see. 10, c. 56, '35 C.S.A., that in a con-
tested case the verdict of a jury was absolutely essential as a prerequisite for a decree
in divorce. Simmons v. Simmons, 107 Colo. 78, 108 P. 2d 871 (1941); Johnson v.
Johnson, 22 Colo. 20, 43 P. 130, 55 Am. St. Rep. 113 (1895).
"COLo. LAWS, §1, 2, p. 398 (1947); COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 56, §39 (Supp. 1949).
See Unused Colorado Enforcement Statute, by Robert P. Davison and Houston Q.
Williams, 21 RocKy MT. L. REY. 385 (1949).
DICTA 403
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enforce orders, judgments, and decrees of other states on proper
docketing of exemplified copies thereof, providing such other
jurisdictions shall have reciprocal provisions for enforcing like
orders entered in the state of Colorado. A second paragraph of
this statute covers somewhat similar matters. The author of this
article knows of no other state having reciprocal provisions.
Divorce cases discussed herein are a few of the great number
appearing in the Supreme Court of Colorado in the past decade.
40
Two cases were concerned with the problem of whether the
necessary residence requirements were satisfied to give the court
jurisdiction under the Colorado statute.41  In Simmons v. Sim-
mons,4' a wife had left the matrimonial domicile in Kansas to
return to her parents home in Colorado because of alleged cruelty.
The husband followed her, to persuade her to return and she agreed
to do so. Before she left Colorado, the husband violated terms of
the agreement. The court held that the wife had a right to renew
her expressed intention to remain in Colorado for at least a year.
In Harms v. Harms,43 plaintiff, seeking a divorce on the ground
of cruelty, alleged and proved more than the necessary residence
before commencement of the action. Defendant, who had resided
in Co!orado for less than one year, filed a cross-complaint on the
same grounds, and was granted a divorce thereon. It was held
that plaintiff's allegations and proof vested the court with juris-
diction of the plaintiff and the subject matter, and that the court
could retain jurisdiction until the equities were settled. Defend-
ant husband under such circumstances was not limited to acts of
cruelty committed by the plaintiff wife in Colorado, if confined
to acts of cruelty subsequent to date of marriage but prior to
date of filing of plaintiff's complaint. The case was reversed on
the ground that defendant should not have been permitted to put
in evidence acts of cruelty committed subsequent to filing of com-
plaint and up to the date of trial without supplemental pleadings
as to such acts.
The effect of the death of a party to a divorce suit was the
problem involved in McLaughlin v. Craig.44 The defendant hus-
band died within six months after an interlocutory decree had
been entered in favor of the plaintiff. It was held that the action
abated and that plaintiff became defendant's widow entitled to
the widow's allowance.
45
40 An interesting article is Divorce Practice in Colorado by Stevens Park Kinney,
21 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 358 (1949).'COLO. STAT. ANN.. C. 56, §6 (1935), provides: "No person shall be granted a
divorce unless such person has been a bona fide resident and citizen of this state dur-
ing the one year next -prior to the commencement of the action . . . provided, this
section shall not affect applications for a divorce upon the grounds of adultery or
extreme cruelty, where the offense was committed within this state."
42 Snpra note 38.
43120 Colo. 212, 209 P. 2d 552 (1949). See, Residence of Plaintiff in Colorado
Necessary to Support a Divorce Action, etc., Edwin M. Sears, 24 Dicta 110 (1947).
" 117 Colo. 67, 184 P. 2d 130 (1917). Cf. Parsons v. Parsons, 70 Colo. 154, 198
P. 156 (1921), construing a statute now repealed.
4A prior property settlement evidently was not affected, but as plaintiff had not
waived the widow's allowance, she was entitled thereto. See supra, note 26; also




There is reiteration of established propositions concerning
alimony, such as, that the statute 46 does not compel a court to
grant alimony,47 that an award of alimony, "rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court ... and what is, and what is not, rea-
sonable and where a reasonable discretion ends and arbitrary ac-
tion begins are not susceptible of mathematical demonstration." 48
A divorce court may properly award alimony in a lump sum.
49
The award of a lump sum as alimony for the purchase of a home
in addition to periodic payments for alimony and support for a
minor child was approved in one case, ° but in a later case was
refused on the basis that no award of custody of a minor was in-
volved. 51 The continuing authority of the trial court to modify
alimony awards is reiterated.
52
DIVISION OF PROPERTY IN DIvORcE
A number of recent cases distinguish a division of property
from alimony. Very recently the Colorado Supreme Court 53 in
construing Kansas Law quoted a Kansas decision: "Alimony has
as its basis the right to maintenance only. Division of property
has as its basis the right to a just and equitable share of the prop-
erty." The Colorado theory is stated in Schreyer v. Schreyer:
54
"The property recovery that Mrs. Schreyer enjoyed was not based
on her right as a wife or Schreyer's responsibilities as a husband.
The property award was made on the basis that it was jointly
accumulated and owned by the parties." The court decreed the
division of a taxi business created by their joint efforts. See also,
Shapiro v. Shapiro,5 5 in which it was held that services rendered
outside the wife's duties as a wife entitled her to property division
as well as alimony, although the statute 56 provides in terms that
the court may, on granting the divorce, provide for reasonable
alimony, or may decree a division of property. The word or was
construed as synonymous with and. In a proper case,5 7 the facts
may be such as to require a transfer from the wife to the husband.
A divorce court has no continuing power to modify its divi-
sion of property orders. 58 This is so whether the settlement was
'COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 56, §8 (1935).
cLiebhardt Case. supra note 28.
48Urling v. Urling, 107 Colo. 186, 109 P. 2d 1060 (1941) ; Zook v. Zook, 118 Colo.
299. 304, 195 P. 2d 387 (1948).
49 Flfer v. Fifer, 119 Colo. 239, 202 P. 2d 945 (1949). In this case, the divorce de-
cree ordered defendant to make certain regular payments on a note secured by a trust
deed on real estate jointly owned by the parties. On default, the husband being outside
the jurisdiction of the court, trial court's order divesting the defendant of his interest
in the property and vesting it in the wife was approved.
mUrling v. Urling, supra note 48.
:'Zook v. Zook, supra note 48.
82 Ibid, p. 302; Pifer v. Fifer, supra note 49.
"3United States National Bank v. Bartges, 120 Colo. 317, 210 P 2d 600 (1949).
5"113 Colo. 219, 155 P. 2d 990 (1945).
"115 Colo. 505, 176 P. 2d 363 (1947).
"COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 56, §8 (1935).
" Bieber v. Bieber, 112 Colo. 229, 148 P. 2d 369 (1944). In this case the husband
furnished all the consideration for a house title to which was placed in the wife's name.
See also, Enforcement of Divorce in Colorado, by William Hedges Robinson, Jr., 21
ROCKY MT. L. REv. 364, 369 (1949).
58Zlaten v. Zlaten, 117 Colo. 296, 186 P. 2d 583 (1947).
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by contract, approved by the court and made part of its decree,
or whether it was a "determination of the property rights of the
parties by the court itself." 59 In a recent case,60 the former wife
was held entitled to damages against the husband for his fraud
in obtaining a property settlement based on a financial statement
in which he concealed assets.
MERGER OF PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS IN DIVORCE DECREE
Four cases 61 discussed the problem of how a property settle-
ment between spouses becomes merged in the divorce decree. The
cases unanimously held that mere reference and approval by the
court is not sufficient. To be enforceable as a decree of court the
rights and obligations of the settlement should be specifically set
forth in its decree so that the rights and duties may be ascertained
from the decree itself. In McWilliams v. McWilliams,62 there was
mere reference to, and approval of, the property and financial set-
tlement in the interlocutory decree of the county court so the
settlement was not enforceable as part of the decree. Therefore,
the obligation to pay $50 per month to the divorced wife as part
of the contract still subsisted, and, although the husband had al-
ready paid $2,000 into the registry of the county court, he was
liable on the unmerged contract in a district court action for delin-
quent payments. In the Campbell case,63 the contract was also
merely referred to with approval. The defendant became delin-
quent in his payments, but enforcement could not be had by means
of contempt proceedings. There was no order of court upon which
such proceedings could be based. In the Edwards 64 and Bartges 65
cases, liability was for a like reason based on the contract and not
the decree.
CUSTODY OF CHILDREN
A divorce court, of course, has jurisdiction to award custody
of children as part of the decree.6 6 Custody may also be awarded
in a controversy between the parents, or between one or both and
a third person through habeas corpus proceedings. However, the
decree of the divorce court awarding custody is res adjudicata un-
less there is a later change of conditions.
67
-Ibid, 299.
d United States National Bank v. Bartges, supra, note 53.
0 McWilliams v. McWilliams, 110 Colo. 173, 132 P. 2d 966 (1942) ; Campbell v.
Goodbar, 110 Colo. 403, 134 P. 2d 1060 (1943) ; Edwards v. Edwards, 113 Colo. 390, 157
P. 2d 616; United States National Bank v. Bartges, supra, note 53. See also Incorporation
by Reference in Colorado, by John Barnard, Jr., 21 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 420 (1949)
Enforcement of Divorce Decrees in Colorado. supra, note 56, pp. 365, 367.
02 Cited last note.
"Supra, note 61.
64 Supra, note 61.
65 Supra, note 61.
N Peterson v. Schwartzmann, 116 Colo. 235, 179 P. 2d 662 (1947).
01 Snyder v. Schmoyer, 106 Colo. 295, 104 P. 2d 612 (1940) ; McMillin v. McMillin,
114 Colo. 247, 158 P. 2d 444, 160 A.L.R. 396 (1945) ; Crocker v. Crocker, Advance
Sheet, Colo. Bar Ass'n, June 10, 1950. The divorce court seems the proper court to
modify the award of custody when there is a change of conditions, Searle v. Searle,
115 Colo. 266, 172 P. 2d 837 (1946); Emerson v. Emerson, 117 Colo. 384, 188 P. 2d
252 (1948). Except if the state of domicile of the child has been changed, McMillin v.
McMillin, supra.
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A number of cases considered problems of conflict of juris-
diction between a divorce court and a court exercising juvenile
jurisdiction. In a late case, it was held that the fact that the best
interests of a child might be bettered will not permit a court exer-
cising juvenile court jurisdiction to take control and declare the
child a dependent as against a divorce court's award unless de-
pendency, such as neglect, improper conditions, etc., actually ex-
ists.6s If dependency actually exists, the juvenile court is not bound
by the prior award.69
In a recent article 70 by two leading Colorado authori-
ties 71 on such matters, it is stated:
It seems clear upon reflection of the cases in this jurisdiction
that although the juvenile court, or the county court as the case may
be, has jurisdiction upon a dependency issue to reaward the custody
of a child despite a divorce court's decree, that the Supreme Court,
understandably, shows considerable reluctance to permit the divorced
parents to parade the children from court room to court room unless
a new ground for dependency exists. It would seem further that
either the juvenile court for the best interests of the child, or the
divorce court, becaused of changed conditions could, if necessary,
reaward custody. Ultimately the question resolves into unnecessary
duplication of jurisdiction.
ILLEGITIMACY
Nuiman v. Cooper 72 involved a dependency proceeding in
which a woman charged respondent with being the father of her
child. The woman's husband had obtained a divorce from her in
New York on the ground of adultery. The divorce action was un-
contested. In that action the plaintiff's husband was permitted
to testify as to nonaccess for the period of conception to prove
the child's illegitimacy, and therefore, the wife's adultery. In the
dependency action in Colorado, testimony by her of such nonaccess
was held properly admitted to prove the child was not her ex-hus-
band's. A transcript of the husband's testimony in the divorce
case was, however, improperly admitted, the husband not having
been subjected to cross-examination.
ADOPTION
In a proceeding to determine heirship,7 3 the validity of the
68 Peterson v. Schwartzmann, supra, note 66, at p. 241 : Snyder v. Schmoyer, supra,
note 67, at p. 296; Arnett v. Northern, 118 Colo. 307, 194 P. 2d 909 (1948).
69Orebaugh v. People, 120 Colo. 377, 209 P. 2d 922 (1949). In Phillips v. Christen-
sen, (Colo.) 216 P. 2d 659 (1950), a dependency court's award to maternal grandpar-
ents was held to be invalid where the father was given no notice of such proceeding.
The divorce court modified its original decree of divided custody to parents, to an
award to the father alone despite the intervening dependency order. The primary right
of the natural parent to custody was emphasized and changed circumstances Justified
the change in its own original decree.
70 The State as Parens Patriae, 21 RocKy MT. L. REV. 375, 383 (1949).
7"Judge Philip B. Gilliam, Judge of the Juvenile Court of the City and County of
Denver; and Thomas A. Gilliam of the Denver Bar.
72120 Colo. 98, 207 P. 2d 814 (1949).
73Zupancis v. Zupancis, 107 Colo. 323, 111 P. 2d 1063 (1941).
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adoption of a child by an intestate was questioned by the latter's
widow. The basis of the attack was that the material facts stated
in the adoption petition, which were necessary to give the county
court jurisdiction, were untrue. It was held that in a collateral
attack on an adoption, as in this heirship proceeding, extrinsic
evidence could not be introduced to show the alleged falsity, the
adoption record being regular on its face. Such extrinsic evidence
may be introduced only in a proceeding directly attacking the
adoption. In this case there were also facts which may have oper-
ated as an estoppel against the widow.
Two cases reaffirmed the accepted construction of the 1931
statute 74 that an adopted child inherits from an adoptive parent
but not through such parent. In the first case, 75 intestate's brother
had adopted a child. The brother died before the intestate. In
a determination of heirship proceeding, certain cousins of the
intestate were declared her heirs at law. The deceased brother's
adopted child got nothing. A similar case was Coffman v. Howell.
76
Both cases mentioned the 1941 amendment 77 to the intestacy law.
The court conceded in the latter case, that its holding in the par-
ticular case being considered, would have favored the adopted
child, had the 1941 amendment been in effect at intestate's death.
In a case 71 involving the construction of a trust instrument,
the court, in effect, ruled that if in a will or trust the testator
makes provision for his own "child or children," there is a pre-
sumption that the adopted child is included in the class with chil-
dren of the blood. A presumption prevails against the inclusion
of the foster child as beneficiary where the instrument is executed
by one person in favor of the "child and children" of another.
Another late case 79 dealt with an amendment to the inherit-
ance tax law, placing persons over the age of twenty-one when
adopted in a higher tax bracket than persons under the age of
twenty-one years when adopted. This discrimination was held
unconstitutional on the facts appearing in the record.
It is to be noted that a new act 80 governing adoption pro-
cedure and the status of adopted children went into effect in 1949.
14 COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 176, §4 (1935). See Smith v. Greenburg, 218 P. 2d 514
(1950). Man murdered wife and adoptive daughter in that order, then killed self.
Daughter was held to have inherited one half mother's property, and on her death, the
murderer inherited adopted daughter's property. See statutes cited under note 77,
15Rogers v. Green, 111 Colo. 85, 137 P. 2d 408 (1943).
16Ill Colo. 359, 141 P. 2d 1017 (1943).
"COLO. LAWS, C. 235, §16, p. 908 (1941) ; COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 176, §4 (1935).
Compare also, CoLo. LAW, §11, p. 210 (1949) ; COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 4, §17 (Supp. 1949),
with Sec. 5, Ch. 4, '35 C.S.A. repealed by the 1949 act.
SBrunton v. International Trust Co., 114 Colo. 298, 164 P. 2d 472 (1945). In this
case it was stated that its results were not inconsistent with the holdings of the last
two cited cases, supra, notes 75 and 76, although the statutes construed therein govern
only intestacy cases and cannot be applied to the provisions of a will or trust. What
effect, if any, will the 1941 amendments, supra, note 77, have on will and trust cases?
"Hogan v. People, 120 Colo. 581, 212 P. 2d 863 (1949).
"CoLo. LAWS, p. 206 (1949).
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